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NOTES
ployee is placed in a very precarious situation: if he follows the
union's orders, he risks discharge by the company; if he follows
the company's orders, he risks being expelled from the union,
or losing his position as shop steward. The arbitrators have not
dealt satisfactorily with this problem. Usually some penalty is.
imposed upon the worker, thus making him a martyr.71 For this,
the arbitrator cannot be blamed entirely, for the fault lies in the
want of power to reach the union and the union officials.
In some cases, the worker is either entirely blameless, merit-
ing no penalty whatsoever, or his conduct does not warrant as
severe a penalty as the arbitrator has imposed. Still arbitrators
have imposed penalties on management's claim that to impose
no penalty would destroy plant discipline ;72 or the arbitrators,
interested in encouraging resort to the grievance machinery,
make awards that will act as deterrents to other employees who
consider "self-help." 73 Such "scape-goat" awards do not seem
proper. HAROLD B. BAMBURG
LOAFING AND LEAVING POST
Loafing and leaving post, as conducts subject to discipline, are
very closely related and often hard to distinguish. An employee
may loaf, or he may leave his post, or he may leave his post for
the purpose of loafing. However, with knowledge that the prob-
lem of distinguishing them exists, for the purposes of this article
an arbitrary distinction will be made. That conduct which takes
an employee away from his regular place of work will be desig-
nated leaving post, while that which occurs on his post will be
designated loafing.
I. LOAFING
Loafing, which Webster defines as "to spend time in idleness;
to lounge or loiter about or along," is a rather abstract concept,
and therefore difficult to handle. As loafing is to a great extent
71. In re Rhode Island Tool Company and United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, Local 1530 (CIO), 7 LA 113 (1946); In re Franklin Tanning Company
and International Fur and Leather Workers Union, Local 31 (CIO), 9 LA
167 (1947).
72. In re Dairymen's League Cooperative Association, Inc. and Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, Local 584 (AFL), 11 LA 1113 (1948).
73. In re Continental Can Company, Inc. and United Steelworkers of
America (CIO), 6 LA 363 (1947).
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a mental state, it is very hard to determine definitely whether a
man is loafing just by looking at him. Moreover, the mere fact
that an employee is slow in out-put is not conclusive evidence
that he has been loafing, and he should not be disciplined on that
ground alone.' Low out-put is often an indication of loafing; and,
if there is further evidence, discipline may be imposed.
One of the reasons why this problem is difficult is that an
employee may be doing absolutely nothing and still there will be
no grounds for disciplining him on the ground that he is loafing.
There are some jobs where the work comes in cycles, and be-
tween cycles there is no duty to be doing anything. Examples of
this are service jobs such as welding and jobs such as driving a
jitney.2 In these cases, the testimony of a foreman, or other
plant official, that the employee was observed to have been idle
is not conclusive evidence of loafing; and, in the absence of
further pertinent evidence, will not justify discipline. Con-
versely, an employee may be very busy, and still be loafing when
his conduct is considered from the company's viewpoint. A man
who is using the company's records on company time to draw up
certain charts for his personal use is definitely loafing.3
Perhaps the most serious loafing offense, and one for which
many contracts provide discharge even on the first offense, is
sleeping on the job.4 Should the arbitrator be satisfied with the
evidence, he will usually sustain any disciplinary action which
has been taken. There is involved, however, a very difficult
problem of evidence. It is practically impossible to tell by look-'
ing, whether a man is asleep, or merely resting with his eyes
1. In re Bryant Heater Company and International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 337 (CO), 3
LA 346 (1946); In re Alan Wood Steel Company and United Steelworkers
of America, Local 1392 (CIO), 4 LA 52 (1946).
2. In re Chrysler Corporation, Marysville Plant and United Automobile
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 379(CIO), 10 LA 110 (1948).
3. In re Title Guarantee and Trust Company of New York and United
Office and Professional Workers of America, Financial Employees Guild,
Local 96 (CI0), 5 LA 240 (1946).
4. In re Louis Marx and Company and Playthings, Jewelry and Novelty
Worker's International Union, Local 149 (CIO), 3 LA 787 (1946); In re
Keystone Asphalt Products Company (division of American Marietta Com-
pany) and United Mine Workers of America, District 50, Local 12405(AFL), 3 LA 789 (1946); In re Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation,
Ft. Worth Division and International Association of Machinists, Aeronauti-
cal Industrial District Lodge 776, 10 LA 844 (1948).
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shut, so the misconduct must often be dealt with as mere loafing.5
An intentional slowdown or interference with the production
schedule is also a serious offense, which, if it is proved to the
arbitrator's satisfaction, will generally lead to disciplinary layoff
or even discharge. These offenses occur frequently where there
has been a recent change in the production schedule. In one case,6
where the time allotted for a job had been 30 minutes and was
reduced to 15 after the operation had been retimed, the arbitrator
found that the men had been discharged for just cause when they
finished the work in 15 minutes and then rested 15 before start-
ing on the next piece. But where employees were suspended for
interfering with the production schedule, and the arbitrator
found the employer had a misconception of the factors which
were delaying the unit, he ordered the men reinstated.7
Generally speaking, systems which attempt to keep every man
at work all the time, in accordance with the "day's work for a
day's pay" doctrine have proved impractical and unenforceable.
Vultee Aircraft Corporation instituted a very comprehensive
plan of this type. It provided that when a break occurs in the
task immediately at hand, the employee should (1) report any
delays to the superintendent, (2) obtain blue-prints to either
study the job at hand, or the next assignment, (3) check over
previous work for errors and bad rivets, etc., (4) be sure that
all necessary equipment is ready for the present assignment, (5)
tidy up work area by removing surplus parts and scraps and,
(6) "Never loaf or sit idle-because there is always work to be
done." Speaking of a violation of these rules, one arbitrator said,
It seems that in a plant of this size there would always be
work to be performed and that every employee might keep
himself occupied at all times, but on the other hand, where
there is no fault to be found with his performance of the
immediate job at hand, it would be a harsh rule to say that
one should be discharged for momentary idleness.8
5. Ibid.
6. In re Fruehauf Trailer Company and United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 99 (CIO), 4 LA 399
(1946).
7. In re Aluminum Cooking Utensil Company and United Steelworkers
of America, Local 302 (CIO), 5 LA 85 (1946).
8. In re Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation, Fort Worth Division
and International Association of Machinists, Aeronautical Industrial Dis-
trict Lodge 776, 9 LA 552 (1948).
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II. LEAVING POST
This class of misconduct occurs when the employee leaves his
work place in violation of a company rule. The walkout, most
serious of these offenses, occurs when an employee leaves the
plant rather than perform an assigned task. The walkout may
result from the employee's being ordered to do something not
within the usual scope of his duties,9 or from a change in work-
ing conditions in his regular work.10 In these cases, the arbitrator
must look to the assignment or change to determine if it is rea-
sonable. If it is, the employee's refusal to comply will be just
cause for some discipline.
A less serious offense is quitting early or leaving the job before
the end of the shift."' This is often a difficult problem, as it
generally results from lax enforcement on the company's part.
It is generally not grounds for discipline for the first offense. A
similar problem arises where an employee who wishes to leave
the plant early applies to his foreman for permission. If the
request is refused and the employee leaves without permission,
the arbitrator must, on appeal, determine whether or not the
refusal was unreasonable in the light of the reason for the re-
quest. 2 If the arbitrator finds that the refusal was not unreason-
able, he will affirm the discipline. That is a chance the employee
takes when he disobeys his superiors.
Perhaps the most common "leaving post" offense is the taking
of rest periods of more than the prescribed number or duration.a
This offense more than any other indicates a definite disregard
and disrespect for the management's rules. While each offense
is perhaps minor and insignificant in itself, there is a great
cumulative, and progressively bad, effect on production and
9. In re Sivyer Steel Casting Company and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 800 (CIO), 1 LA
485 (1945).
10. In re Briskin Manufacturing Company and United Automobile
Workers of America, Amalgamated Local 286 (AFL), 6 LA 9 (1946).
11. In re John Deere Tractor Company and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Workers of America, Local 838 (CIO), 4 LA 161 (1946);
In re Adler Manufacturing Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Jointers, Local 3160 (AFL), 4 LA 700 (1946).
12. Ibid.; In re Ford Motor Company and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (CIO), 8 LA 1023 (1947).
13. In re Sivyer Steel Casting Company and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 800 (CIO), 1 LA
485 (1945); In re Boston Sausage and Provision Company and United
Packing House Workers of America, Local 11 (C10), 2 LA 128 (1946).
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morale. It is in this situation that the early imposition of mild
discipline could obtain the desired result, and the arbitrator
would do well to impose progressively more severe discipline even
though the contract does not require him to do so.
III. UNION ACTITIES
Where the offenses of loafing or leaving post occur in conmec-
tion with union activities, there arises a somewhat different
problem, which should be treated separately. Contracts generally
provide for pre-arbitration grievance procedure, often for a
meeting of a committee of the workers and of the management
in an attempt to arrive at an acceptable compromise. Where
that procedure is abandoned and an unofficial group of employees
attempts to take things into its own hand and calls en masse on
its foreman, or other official, during working hours,14 there is
usually just cause for minor disciplinary action taken against
the employees as a group. However, it should be noted that an
arbitrator should not sustain the company's disciplinary action
where it has taken one employee from such a group and dis-
charged him as an example to the rest of the employees. 5 Gen-
erally speaking, an arbitrator will never uphold such an action
in the absence of conclusive evidence that the conduct of the
employee was deserving of the discipline.
A still more difficult problem is that of disciplining the shop
steward. A vigorous protest is raised every time the problem
arises, the union claiming the steward was discharged for union
activities and the company saying that if the employee were not
a steward, they would have disciplined him much sooner.'6 The
arbitrator, therefore, must look strictly to the merits of the case,
keeping in mind that by the terms of the contract the steward
must be allowed a certain amount of time to attend to union
affairs. But if the steward is found to have abused his privi-
leges, the arbitrator should award discipline.
14. In re Republic Steel Corporation and United Steelworkers of America,
Local 2176 (CIO), 6 LA 85 (1947).
15. In re Pacific Mills and Textile Workers Union of America, Local 254(CIO), 2 LA 545 (1946); In re Argonne Worsted Company and Industrial
Trades Union of America, 4 LA 81 (1946).
16. In re Columbian Rope Company and United Farm Equipment and
Metal Workers, Local 184 (CIO), 3 LA 90 (1946).
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IV. MITIGATING FACTORS
When the arbitrator is presented with a dispute, there is a
certain procedure which he should follow in these cases. First,
he should review the evidence to determine whether or not the
employee did in fact do what is charged against him. If the
company disciplined him for being away from his job from 9:00
a. m. to 10:00 a. m. on the morning of June 1, 1949, the arbitrator
must make a finding of fact as to whether or not the employee
was actually gone during that time.
Second, he must decide if discipline was justified. There may
be some valid excuse for the employee's conduct. Valid mistake
on the employee's part as to what job has actually been assigned,
will very often serve to excuse the employee for what would
otherwise be just cause for discipline.17 Waiting for materials or
tools or an assistant may be valid excuses for what would other-
wise be loafing. A valid nistake as to the enforcement of a
company rule will sometimes serve to excuse an offense. 8 Some-
thing analogous to the estoppel doctrine is applied here. The
company may have all sorts of rules "on the books," but if they
are not enforced during a long period of time, the employee may
be acting reasonably in assuming them no longer to be in ex-
istence, and the company will be denied the privilege of enforcing
them.
Though some discipline is justified, the arbitrator may feel
that the action taken was too severe because of some "fault" on
the company's part. One arbitrator has stated that:
When an employee alleges that he was discharged or
penalized without good cause, he places at issue not only his
own conduct, but that of the employer, as well. Present in
every such case is the question of whether or not the em-
ployer was properly exercising his disciplinary functions
under the agreement. The Umpire must ask not only, "What
did Employee do?" but also, such questions as "What did
Management do to warn and correct him? Did Management
treat other employees, similarly situated, in the same way?
In the last analysis and under all the circumstances, was
Management fair?" These inquiries have constantly been
pursued by the Umpire in discipline cases. Only when they
17. In re The Mosaic Tile Company and Federation of Glass, Ceramic
and Silica Sand Workers of America, Local 79 (CIO), 9 LA 625 (1948).
18. In re John Deere Tractor Company and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Workers of America, Local 838 (CIO), 4 LA 161 (1946).
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were answered has the Umpire been able to decide whether
the Management's exercise of its right to discipline for cause
was proper and should be upheld. 9
This is somewhat analogous to the comparative negligence
doctrine in Tort law. If the action taken by the employee was
instigated by some "fault" on the part of the management, the
arbitrator will often reduce the punishment, stating that the
employee was deserving of some punishment, but not as much
as the company gave.20 Likewise, the company may be at "fault"
in not following the grievance procedure,21 or the provision call-
ing for progressive disciplinary steps.22
Third, even if the arbitrator has decided that the employee is
deserving of a penalty, and the company has not been at fault,
there may be other factors to consider in deciding what dis-
cipline should be awarded. Length of service is often one of the
most important of these factors. In one case, an employee of
nine years conscientious service was found asleep on the job.
The contract provided for discharge for the first offense. The
arbitrator held that although seniority and a good record did
not give an employee extra privileges, it should entitle the em-
ployee to "consideration" in the case of a violation. 2 3 A con-
sistently good attitude will be considered in deciding whether to
uphold a harsh disciplinary measure.24 Likewise, arbitrators
will also take into consideration such things as the employee's
state of health,25 his war service record and readjustment prob-
lem,2 6 and many other things.
19. In re Valley Dolomite Corporation and International Union of Mine,
Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 618 (CIO), 11 LA 98, 99 (1948), quoting
the permanent umpire for General Motors and United Automobile Workers.
20. In re Shartle Bros. Division, Black Clawson Co. and Int'l. Ass'n. of
Machinists, Local 1850, 3 ALAA %68068 (1948).
21. In re Valley Dolomite Corporation and International Union of Mine,
Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 618 (CIO), 11 LA 98 (1948).
22. In re Bryant Heater Company and International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 337 (CIO),
3 LA 346 (1946).
23. In re Louis Marx and Company and Playthings, Jewelry, and Novelty
Worker's International Union, Local 149 (CI0), 3 L-A 787 (1946).
24. In re Sperry Gyroscope Company and United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America, Local 450 (CIO), 10 LA 687 (1948).
25. In re Shartle Bros. Division, Black Clawson Co. and Int'l. Ass'n. of
Machinists, Local 1850, 3 ALAA %68068 (1948).
26. In re Sears, Roebuck and Company and Department Store Employees
Union, Local 1100 (AFL), 6 LA 211 (1947).
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V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let it be remembered that the twin misconducts,
loafing and leaving post, are very closely related and will often
be found together. They are relatively minor offenses and are
important only because they have a tendency to become habitual.
They are difficult to deal with because the offense depends to a
great extent on the state of mind of the employee. It is this
question of evidence which will present the greatest problem to
the arbitrator. The problem is further complicated by the fact
that there are some jobs which do not require constant attention.
The arbitrator will have to extend his abilities to the limit and
exercise his greatest discretion where the offense is connected
with union activities, and most especially where a shop steward
has been disciplined.
Perhaps the most important idea which can be taken from this
study of arbitration awards is the value of catching these of-
fenses when they first begin and imposing minor discipline.
Then, with the recurrence of the offense, progressively more
severe discipline should be imposed. In this way both the em-
ployee and the company will be aware of the exact situation and
better labor-management relations will be achieved.27
MCCORMICK WILSON.
UNION ACTIVITIES
An employer can no longer discharge or otherwise discipline
his employees merely because they belong to a union or engage
in union activities. In 1935 and again in 1947 federal statutes
secured these rights to employees engaged in production for
interstate commerce. The labor relations acts of some states
contain similar provisions, and express guarantees are com-
monly written into collective bargaining agreements.1
27. In re Old Colony Furniture Company and United Furniture Workers
of America, Local 136-B (CIO), 2 ALAA %67777 (1947); In re National
Lead Company, De Lore Division and United Gas, Coke and Chemical
Workers of America, Local 229 (CIO), 9 LA 973 (1948).
1. In nearly all of these cases the arbitrator is faced with the construe-
.tion of a contract between the employer and the union. Typical of this type
of contract is that set out in In re Chattanooga Box & Lumber Company
and United Woodworkers of America, Local 1271 (CIO), 10 LA 260 (1948):
"The company agrees that it shall not discriminate against any of
its employees because of union affiliation, and the union and its officers,
representatives or members agree that:
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